Bank One, Utah, National Association, Valley Bank and Trust Company, National Association v. Paul Herwit : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Bank One, Utah, National Association, Valley Bank
and Trust Company, National Association v. Paul
Herwit : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Grant W. P. Morrison; Attorney for Appellant.
Arnold Richer; Mark S. Swan; Richer, Swan and Overholt; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation








BANK ONE, UTAH, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, fka VALLEY BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
PAUL HERWIT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellate Court No. 950714 CA 
Priority No. 15 
tea-74 
-00O00-
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
-0O0--
APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
COURT, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS 
PRESIDING, GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
-0O0-
Grant W.P. Morrison 
1200 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 
Attorney for Appellant 
Arnold Richer - 2751 
Mark S. Swan - 3873 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
Attorneys for Appellee 
F 
FFB 1 6 1996 
00021377 .L96 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00-
BANK ONE, UTAH, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, fka VALLEY BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
PAUL HERWIT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellate Court No. 950714 CA 
Priority No. IS 
-00O00-
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
— 0 O 0 - -
APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
COURT, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS 
PRESIDING, GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
-0O0-
Grant W.P. Morrison 
1200 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 
Arnold Richer - 2751 
Mark S. Swan - 3873 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Attorney for Appellant 
00021377146 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
APPELLEE'S REBUTTAL TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 8 
ARGUMENT 11 
POINT I 11 
HERWIT CANNOT RAISE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED 
BEFORE THE LOWER COURT 
POINT n 14 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHEN THERE IS NO 
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT 
POINT EI 15 
THE CIRCUIT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT HERWIT 
DID NOT RAISE ANY ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT RELEVANT TO 
BANK ONE'S STATUS AS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE 
A. Bank One gave "value" for Herwit's check. 16 
B. Bank One acted in "good faith" 16 
1. Allowing immediate credit on uncollected 
funds on deposit is not a lack of "good 
faith." 17 
00021377.L96 1 
2. Bank One did immediately debit its 
customer's account 18 
3. Bank One did not allow continuing credits on 
uncollected funds after Herwit's check was 
returned for insufficient funds 19 
C. Bank One acted without notice of any defects 20 
POINT IV 26 
THE CIRCUIT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
HERWIT'S AFFIDAVITS FAILED TO RAISE ANY AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE ENFORCEMENT OF THE 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Bangerterv. Poulton. bU I'ii.l Mill (III..!. I'll! I) 
Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988) 2 
Citizens Nat'l Banks of Anglewood v. Fort Lee Saving & Loan Assoc. 213 A.2d 315 
(N.J. 1965) 
Citv of Phoenix v. Great Western Bank & Trust. 712 P.2d 966, (Ariz. App. 1985). 
Espinal v. Salt Lake Citv Bd. Of Educ. 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990) 
Exchange Nat'l Bank of Winterhaven v. Beshara. 236 So. 2d 198 (Fla. App. 1970). . . 18 
First America Bank-Northest Illinois. NA v. Bocian. 614 JM I,, <i<i W)u 
(Til Ano. 2d dist. 1993) _. 
Frantz v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage. 584 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Alaska 1978). . i« 
Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 12 
Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986). . . . 27 
Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 19«w 12 
Heolar Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) 14 
Tager & Branch. Inc. v. Pappas. 433 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1967) 28 
Norton v. Blackham. 22 
Seinfeld v. Commercial Bank and Trust Co.. 45 So.2d 1029 (Fla. App. 
3 Dist. 1981) 24 
Treloooan v. Treloggan. 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985) 22 
United Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Willev. 444 P.2d 775 (Utah 1968) 12 
Vail Nat'l Bank v. T. Wheeler Construction Corp.. 669 P.2d 1038, 1040 
(Colo. App. 1983) 18 
( - i .U 
Vallev Bank of Nevada v. TER Management Corp Ill, !IOti |Anz. App. 
1986) , 18, 19 
Walker v. Rockv Mt. Recreation Corp.. 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973). 22 
Williams v. Melbv. 679 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) 22 
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Am. Title Ins.. 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988). , 13 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201 (26) (b) (1993: • 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 15, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302(l) . . . 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302(6) (1993). . . 21, 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-305 (1953 as amended) 15, 26 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-305(2) (1953, as amended) 15 
1 § 70A-3-308 28 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-414(2) (1993) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-210(2) 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-214(5) (1953, as amended). 19 
Utah Code Ann., § 70A-3-103(l)(d) (1993). 17 
Utah Code Ann., § 70A-3-301 (1953 as amended) 15 
Utah Code Ann., § 70A-3-302(b) (1953 as amended) 20 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953, as amended) 1 
00021377.L96 hr 
RULES- Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 27 
Rule 12, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 2, 13, 14 
RULES - Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 4 
Rule 24(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 4 
Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 31 
RULES - Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration 2 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Bakley Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections, and Credit Cards, 2-3 
(rev. ed. 1995) 18 
Commercial and Debtor/Creditor Law, selected statutes 1995 ed. 
Foundation Press, § 3-305, p. 333, comment 2 22 
Henry J. Bailey and Richard B. Hagedom, Brady on Bank Checks, 8-15 (7th ed. 
1992) 17, 25 
U.C.C. Rep. 2d 838 19 
U.C.C. § 3-305 21 
00021377.L96 V 
HJRBDICTION AND NATURE OF PRQfre^TMns 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals to hear 
this appeal by Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2) (d) (1953, as amended). 
2. This appeal is from an Order of the Third Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding, granting Plaintiff/Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment pursuant to which Motion Appellee sought enforcement of 
Defendant/Appellant's drawer liability on a check. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. In light of the fact that Appellant failed to file in the Circuit Court 
any memorandum of law or make any argument in opposition to Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, may the Appellant now raise legal arguments for the first time on 
appeal which should have been presented to the lower court? By failing to present 
any legal argument to the lower court, Appellant failed to preserve for appeal the 
issues submitted to this Court as alleged errors of the lower court. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank v. Nat'l Am. Title Ins.. 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988). 
2. Did the affidavits, filed by Appellant in response to Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, raise a genuine issue as to a material fact which could 
have precluded the lower court from finding that Appellee took the check for value, 
acted in good faith and without notice of defenses at the time it took Appellants's 
check, and was therefore entitled to holder in due course status? Appellee's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was granted by the lower court as a matter of law and is 
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therefore subject to review for correctness. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248 
(UtahApp. 1988). 
3. Did the affidavits filed by Appellant in opposition to Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, raise a genuine issue as to any material fact as to the 
existence of a defense to the check which would have precluded Appellee as a holder, 
from enforcing Appellant's drawer liability? Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was granted by the lower court as a matter of law and is therefore subject to review 
for correctness. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
[c] Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time affixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration: 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of motion. The points and 
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment 
shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement 
of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine 
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of 
the record upon which the movant relies. 
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(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and 
authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement 
of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine 
issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those 
portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, 
and if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All 
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record 
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing 
party's statement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The underlying law suit is one for collection against the drawer of a 
check pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-414(2) (1993), deposited by a bank 
customer which did not clear Appellant was the drawer of a $9,000.00 check made 
payable to Aristocrat Travel as payee. The check was drawn on Appellant's account 
at First Security Bank. Aristocrat Travel deposited Appellant's check in its account 
with Appellee. Appellee allowed Aristocrat Travel to draw on uncollected funds. 
Thereafter, Appellant's check was returned to Appellee by First Security Bank due to 
insufficient funds in Appellant's account. Appellee's action was commenced by the 
filing of a Complaint on August 2, 1995. (R. 1.) Pursuant to its Complaint, Appellee, as 
holder and holder in due course of a check, sought recovery from Appellant as the 
drawer thereof. (R. 1.) On August 14, 1995, Appellant filed an unverified Answer 
which included no affirmative defenses or counterclaims. (R.10) 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on August 31, 1995. 
(R. 13) That Motion was supported by a memorandum of law (R. 15) and a supporting 
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affidavit (R. 28)1. On September 14, 1995, Appellant filed two affidavits in opposition to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 40 and 42). Appellant filed no memorandum in 
opposition to Plaintiff's Motion and did not request a hearing. 
Appellee filed a reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of its Motion for Summary Judgment and submitted the matter for decision on 
September 14, 1995 (R. 44 and 52). The Motion for Summary Judgment was granted 
by the Third Circuit Court on September 28, 1995 (R. 58). 
APPELLEE'S REBUTTAL TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS, 
Appellant has prepared a Statement of Facts which is not supported by 
any record references. This is in violation of Rule 24(a)(7) and (e), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Therefore, the Appellant's Statement of Facts should be 
disregarded. 
Further, an examination of Appellant's Statement of Facts reveals that the 
lack of references to the record is due to the fact that the allegations made therein are 
absolutely unsupported, and, in fact, contradicted by the record below. Specifically, 
Appellee would bring to the Court's attention the following allegations of Appellant's 
Statement of Facts: 
1
 Due to the many references to the Affidavit of Deanne Freeman in support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, a courtesy copy is attached hereto as an 
Addendum. 
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1. 'The check . . . was meant to purchase ownership in the 
company." (Page 5, two lines from bottom.)2 There is no evidence in the record to 
support for this allegation. 
2. "... Bank One credited Aristocrat's account for $9,000.00 but did 
not allow Aristocrat to immediately withdraw funds in the amount of the check." (Page 
6,1. 5.) This allegation is unsupported by the record and, in fact, is contradicted by 
the Affidavit of Deanne Freeman (R. 35, see Addendum) which reflects that Appellant's 
check was deposited in Aristocrat's account with Appellee on May 25, 1995, and the 
balance of the account was withdrawn by Aristocrat on May 26, 1995. 
3. "On May 30, 1995 . . . Bank One allowed Aristocrat to make a 
withdrawal in the amount of the check." (Page 6, line 7.) The only information in the 
record which discusses withdrawal by Aristocrat of monies from its account are in R. 
35, see Addendum, and reflects that the sums in the account were withdrawn on May 
26, 1995. 
4. "That very same day [May 30, 1995, the date of the notice of 
insufficient funds] . . . [R]ather than immediately debiting $9,000.00 from Aristocrat's 
account, Bank One continued to credit the account in the amount of Herwit's check." 
(P. 6,11. 8-12.) The only record reference to the actions of the Appellee after receipt of 
the notice of insufficient funds establishes that the account was charged back on May 
2
 References in this rebuttal are references to page and line numbers of 
Appellant's Brief. 
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31, 199S and there was no "continuing credit" for the amount of Appellant's check. (R. 
35, see Addendum.) 
5. "Aristocrat subsequently became insolvent and filed for 
bankruptcy." (P. 6,1. 17.) There is nothing in the record which supports this 
allegation. 
6. At page 10 of his brief, Appellant quotes to the court certain 
language and refers to paragraph 6 and 7 of the Affidavit of Francee Jolley as support 
therefore. The quoted language does not appear in the Affidavit of Francee Jolley and 
that Affidavit does not even contain paragraphs numbered 6 or 7. 
7. Appellant makes reference in his brief, on numerous occasions, to 
normal commercial banking practices. Instances follow: 
a. "Had Bank One properly waited for the check to clear, as 
the normal commercial practice clearly calls for . . .." (P. 11,1. 17.) 
b. "The prescribed commercial practice in this instance would 
have been to . . . " (P. 11,1. 22.) 
c. "Had Bank One observed the normal practice of. . .." (P. 
12,1. 3.) 
d. "Similarly, Bank One's failure in the instant case to twice 
follow prescribed commercial practice for . . . ." (P. 13,1. 5.) 
The record before the lower court reveals no evidence whatsoever 
regarding "normal" commercial practices. 
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Based on all of the foregoing, Appellee respectfully requests that the 
Appellant's factual allegations should be disregarded by the Court and the Court's 
review of this matter should be based upon Appellee's summary and statement of 
relevant facts set forth below, all of which are supported by record references. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant is, or was a customer of First Security Bank at which 
institution he maintained a checking account. (R. 2, 6, 15, 27, and 33). 
2. On May 19, 1995, Appellant drew check number 2526 on his 
account at First Security Bank in the amount of $9,000.00 made payable to the order of 
"Aristocrat." (R. 15, 16, 27, 33, and 40.) 
3. On May 25, 1995, check number 2526 was deposited by Aristocrat 
Travel and Cruises of Park City, Inc. to its account at Bank One, Utah. (R. 29 at H 4; 
33; and 35; see Addendum3.) 
4. "Aristocrat," the payee of check number 2526, withdrew from its 
account at Bank One, Utah on May 26, 1995, the entire contents thereof in the sum of 
$16,071.40 including the credit given for check number 2526. (R. 35 ninth line from 
bottom of page; and R. 29 at 11 6, see Addendum.) 
3
 The Appellant contends in his Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion that 
the instrument was deposited on May 26, 1995. This dispute is irrelevant. However, an 
examination of the reverse side of check number 2526 (R. 6) bears the dated deposit 
stamp reflecting a deposit date of May 25, 1995. Similarly, the account statements 
submitted into evidence through the affidavit of Deanne Freeman (R. 35) also 
corroborates a deposit date of May 25, 1995. 
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8. Four days later, on May 30, 1995, First Security Bank, the drawee 
of check number 2526, dishonored the instrument as a result of insufficient funds and 
returned it to Bank One. (R 42 at H 5; and R 29 at H 7, see Addendum.) 
6. On May 31, 1995, Bank One, Utah, charged back the sum of 
$9,000.00 against the account of the payee, Aristocrat Travel as well as a return check 
charge. (R 29 at H 6; and R 35 fifth line from bottom, see Addendum.) 
7. As a result of the fact that Aristocrat Travel had already withdrawn 
the balance of the account, this charge back resulted in a negative balance in said 
entity's account in the amount of $9,346.06 as of May 31, 1995. (R. 29 at 11 6; and R 
35, see Addendum.) 
8. Bank One's notice that check number 2526 would not be honored 
by the drawee, First Security Bank was received on or about May 31, 1995 (R. 29 at H 
7, see Addendum), five days after the payee had withdrawn all funds in its account. (R 
35 nine lines from bottom.) 
9. Appellant asserts in his affidavit that the instrument was deposited 
by the payee, at Bank One, Utah, on May 26, 1995 (R 40 at 11 4). 
10. Appellant alleges that at some date "thereafter" (after May 26, 
1995) and continuing for two months, he had communications with Bank One, Utah, 
which communications would constitute "notice" to Bank One, Utah that check number 
2526 would not clear. (R. 41 at H 5.) 
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11. The affidavit of Francee Jolley, an officer of First Security Bank, the 
drawee, establishes that no notice was given by First Security Bank to Bank One as to 
the insufficiency of funds until, at the earliest, May 30, 1995. (R. 42.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellant did not plead any affirmative defenses in his unverified 
answer. Appellant did not raise any defenses by way of subsequent motions, did not 
file any memorandum in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment; and, did not 
request a hearing. Appellant now raises legal arguments on appeal, for the first time, 
that Bank One had some sort of notice, at the time it took the instrument in question, 
that should have precluded the lower court from concluding that Bank One acted in 
good faith and without notice at the time it took the instrument. These arguments 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and therefore the lower court's ruling 
should be affirmed. 
2. Appellant argues that affidavits filed in opposition to the underlying 
Motion for Summary Judgment raise a question of fact with regard to whether Bank 
One had some notice which should have precluded the lower court from concluding 
that Bank One acted in good faith and without notice in taking the instrument in 
question. If Bank One had prior notice it would not be able to enforce the instrument 
as a holder in due course and therefore, free of any defenses which Appellant may 
assert to the instrument. However, under Utah law notice and good faith are to be 
measured at the time the instrument is taken. It is undisputed that Bank One took the 
instrument on May 25, 1995, and gave value therefore on May 26, 1995. Appellant's 
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own affidavits establish that no notice was given to Bank One of any infirmity in the 
instrument until after May 26, 1995. Consequently, Bank One's status as a holder in 
due course is established as a matter of law and the lower court's ruling should be 
affirmed. 
3. Alternatively, Appellant appears to argue that Bank One did not act 
in good faith and is therefore not a holder in due course because it failed to mitigate 
its damages by promptly charging back the account of the payee Aristocrat Travel. 
This allegation is simply untrue and unsupported by the record. The record 
establishes that the check was deposited by the payee on May 25, 1995 and the funds 
withdrawn on May 26, 1995. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Appellee 
had any notice prior to May 26, 1995 on which it could have based any decision to 
earlier charge back the account of the payee. Further, Aristocrat Travel's account 
was charged back immediately after receipt of the notice from First Security Bank that 
Appellant had insufficient funds in his account. (R. 29 at 11 6; and R. 35, see 
Addendum.) Finally, this defense (failure to mitigate damages) was not raised by 
Appellant either by answer or subsequent motion. Again, the lower court's ruling is 
well supported and should be affirmed. 
4. The status of Bank One as a holder need only be reached by this 
Court in the event Bank One is deemed not to be a holder in due course. Even if Bank 
One is only a holder, it may still enforce the check subject to defenses properly raised 
by Appellant. Appellant did not raise any defenses by way of answer or subsequent 
motion. It is somewhat unclear what defenses Appellant is attempting to raise now, for 
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the first time on appeal. However, it seems that Appellant is attempting to raise lack of 
consideration as a defense. This is predicated on his argument that the check was 
written to purchase an equity position in Aristocrat Travel, the payee. Appellant argues 
that he received nothing for his money because that entity subsequently went bankrupt. 
The purpose for which the check was written is not in the record nor is the present 
status of the payee, Aristocrat Travel. Even if these "facts" were in the record, they 
would be irrelevant. These facts would only be relevant to the wisdom of the 
Appellant's purchase, not to the legal sufficiency of the consideration. Finally, lack of 
consideration was not raised by way of answer or subsequent motion. As there is no 
evidence in the record of any defense, the lower court properly held that Bank One 
could enforce the check as a holder, and this ruling should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
HERWTT CANNOT RAISE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS WHICH SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE LOWER COURT 
Two of the elements of holder in due course status are that the holder 
takes an instrument in good faith and without notice of certain enumerated defects. 
Herwit now argues that Bank One had certain notice which should have precluded the 
lower court from determining that the instrument in question was taken in good faith 
and without notice. Herwit also argues that he has certain defenses to the underlying 
instrument which defenses can be raised against Bank One in the event Bank One is 
determined to be a mere holder. These legal arguments and defenses were not made 
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in any pleading before the lower court and cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
By way of his answer, Herwit raised no affirmative defenses. (R. 10.) 
Herwit's answer is unverified and therefore, under Utah law, the allegations appearing 
in dicta therein may not be considered in opposing a motion for summary judgment. 
OJnited Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Willev. 444 P.2d 7S5 (Utah 1968); Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker 
Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975); and Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 
1983).) 
Likewise, Herwit failed to raise defenses by subsequent motion and failed 
to submit a memorandum containing any legal argument to the court in opposition to 
the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment. As a result, Herwit has failed to 
preserve any issue for appeal. "With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has 
been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal." Espinal v. 
Salt Lake City Bd. Of Educ. 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). 
This standard has also been applied in the summary judgment context in 
the case of Banaerter v. Poulton. 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). In addressing arguments 
made in an appellant's brief which arguments had not been made to the lower court, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
Plaintiffs in their brief suggest that fraud and illegality, 
though not specifically pleaded, actually existed, and that 
they should be allowed to pursue these defenses through 
additional discovery. It is axiomatic that defenses and 
claims not raised by the parties in the trial court cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal. 
Id. at 102. 
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This rule applies with equal force even in those situations in which the 
matter being reviewed is a question of law. This was made clear in the case of Zions 
First Nat'l Bank v, Nat'l Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), in which case the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the policy behind the rule. 
National American's third claim on appeal is that an agency 
relationship existed between Jeffery Olson and Zions and 
that as a result, Jeffery's knowledge of the forgery should 
be imputed to Zions. This claim has been raised on appeal 
for the first time, generally we do not consider issues that 
were not presented to the trial court 
Id. at 654. 
The Utah Supreme Court went on to make it clear that this applied even 
to questions of law. 
Because we do not defer to trial court's determinations of 
legal questions, National American contends that we are as 
well situated as the trial court to deal with the issue. 
National American's position ignores one of the reasons for 
refusing to consider any matter for the first time on appeal, 
even a matter of law. Although we may not defer to a trial 
court's conclusions on a legal question, we certainly may 
derive great benefit from the trial judge's views on the 
issue and may be persuaded by those views. This provides 
ample justification for refusing to consider National 
American's claim. 
Id 
Had Herwit, articulated his arguments before the trial court concerning 
good faith, notice, mitigation of damages, and lack of consideration, Bank One would 
have had an opportunity to respond thereto. The trial court would have had an 
opportunity to review the arguments and this Court would have the benefit of a 
complete record on those issues. Herwit, cannot forego his opportunity to bring these 
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issues to the attention of the trial court and then be permitted to base an appeal 
thereon. This Court should therefore disregard Herwit's claims of error and affirm the 
trial court's ruling. 
POINT n 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHEN THERE IS NO 
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT 
The standard for entry of summary judgment as set forth in 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads in relevant part as follows: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Utah case law makes it clear that Rule 56 requires two (2) separate 
inquiries. There must be a genuine issue of fact to be resolved by the trier-of-fact. 
Further, the disputed fact must be material to the outcome of the action. The 
foregoing rule does not preclude summary judgment simply whenever some fact 
remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted." Healar 
Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). If this Court considers 
Herwit's alleged defenses, which are raised for the first time on appeal, there is no 
dispute of any material fact relevant to Bank One's right to summary judgment. It is 
undisputed that Herwit drew a check on his account at First Security Bank made 
payable to the order of Aristocrat Travel. It is undisputed that Aristocrat Travel 
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deposited that check to its account with Bank One, on May 25, 1995 and withdrew the 
funds so deposited on May 26, 1995. 
The only issues are: (1) Whether Bank One had some notice, at the time 
it took the instrument in question which would preclude it from enforcing the 
instrument as a holder in due course; and (2) if Bank One is only a holder, are there 
any material issues demonstrating that Herwit has real defenses to enforcement. The 
only material filed by the Herwit in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment is 
in the form of two affidavits, neither of which raise a relevant question of material fact 
on these issues. Thus, without material issues of fact, summary judgment in Bank 
One's favor was appropriate and this ruling should be affirmed. 
POINT DI 
THE CIRCUIT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
HERWIT DID NOT RAISE ANY ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
RELEVANT TO BANK ONE'S STATUS AS A HOLDER IN 
DUE COURSE 
It is undisputed that Herwit is the drawer of a check which instrument 
was subsequently dishonored. It is undisputed that Herwit's liability as drawer may be 
enforced by any holder. Utah Code Ann., § 70A-3-301 (1953 as amended). It is 
undisputed that Bank One is a holder of the check. If Bank One is a holder in due 
course (§ 70A-3-302), Herwit's liability is absolute as he has no defenses against Bank 
One (§ 70A-3-305(2)). If Bank One is only a holder, then it may still enforce the 
instrument if there are no real defenses precluding enforcement. The first issue to be 
considered by this Court is whether Bank One is the holder in due course (hereinafter 
"HDC"). If not, and Bank One is merely a holder, then this Court must decide whether 
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Herwit has raised any material facts which support defenses to enforcement. (See 
Point IV.) 
There are three criteria for determining whether Bank One was a HDC. 
Those are that the instrument must be taken (1) for value, (2) in good faith, and (3) 
without notice that it is overdue or had been dishonored or of any defense against it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302Q). If all of these criteria are met, then Bank One can 
enforce the instrument free from all Herwit's defenses. (§ 70A-3-305, 306.) 
A. Bank One gave "value" for Herwit's check. 
It is undisputed that after Herwit's check for $9,000.00 was deposited by 
Aristocrat Travel with Bank One, Bank One gave full value one day later. Value was 
give when Aristocrat Travel was allowed to draw on uncollected funds, which it 
accomplished by withdrawing the entire balance of its account, $16,071.40, on May 26, 
1995. (R. 35; and R. 29, see Addendum.) As earlier stated, Herwit's argument that 
Bank One "continued to allow drawings" after notice is totally unsupported. Value was 
given all at one time on May 26, 1995. This will be an important distinction when 
considering the element of "notice," discussed below. Thus, Bank One has met the 
first criteria of HDC status. 
B. Bank One acted in "good faith" 
Herwit makes three arguments that there is a question of fact on whether 
Bank One acted in "good faith." First, Herwit argues that when Bank One immediately 
allowed Aristocrat Travel to draw monies against the deposited funds, that Bank One 
failed to follow "prescribed commercial practices" and this is lack of good faith. 
00021377.L96 16 
Second, Herwit argues that Bank One's failure to immediately debit Aristocrat Travel's 
account after notice of insufficient fiinds is lack of good faith. Third, Herwit argues that 
Bank One did not act in good faith because it continued to allow Aristocrat Travel to 
draw on the uncollected funds after notice of insufficient funds. As is shown below, all 
of these arguments are without merit, either because the undisputed facts contradict 
the arguments, or there is no legal support for them. Therefore, there is no material 
issue of fact on the "good faith" element of Bank One's HDC status. 
1. Allowing immediate credit on uncollected funds on deposit 
is not a lack of "good faith." 
Contrary to Herwit's citation of the definition of good faith, the correct 
statutory definition is " 'good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned." Utah Code Ann., § 70A-3-103(l)(d) (1993). This criteria has 
been defined as a purely subjective test. However, Herwit argues that the test is an 
objective one, i.e., did Bank One follow "prescribed commercial practices?" However, 
Herwit's proposed standard has repeatedly been held to not be the test for 
determining "good faith." Rather, the test is one of: 
[H]onesty and good faith, and not by a speculative issue as 
to his diligence or negligence. The rights of a holder 
cannot be defeated without proof of actual notice or bad 
faith on his part. In short, the holder is deemed to take the 
instrument in good faith if he takes it with a complete 
absence of knowledge; he is normally under no affirmative 
duty to ascertain the facts that induced the instrument 
before he takes it." 
Henry J. Bailey and Richard B. Hagedorn, Brady on Bank Checks, 8-15 (7th ed. 1992). 
This commentator goes on further to state : 
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The subjective test of good faith has been applied where a 
bank takes a check on deposit that is drawn on a different 
bank and permits the depositor to draw against the check 
before it has been collected. In other words, where a 
depository bank permits a drawing against uncollected 
funds, lack of good faith is not indicated on the part of that 
bank. 
Id. at pp. 8-20. This position is the near unanimous position of courts which have 
considered this issue. See Valley Bank of Nevada v. TER Management Corp.. 719 P.2d 
301, 306 (Ariz. App. 1986); Vail Nat'l Bank v. T. Wheeler Construction Corp.. 669 P.2d 
1038, 1040 (Colo. App. 1983); and Frantz v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage. 584 P.2d 
1125, 1127 (Alaska 1978). In fact, the purpose of the HDC rule is to promote 
commerce and encourage banks to immediately provide credit on deposited items. 
Frantz. supra.: Exchange Nat'l Bank of Winterhaven v. Beshara. 236 So. 2d 198, 201 
(Fla. App. 1970); Citizens Nat'l Banks of Anglewood v. Fort Lee Saving & Loan Assoc. 
213 A.2d 315, 319 (N.J. 1965); see also Bakley Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, 
Collections, and Credit Cards, 2-3 (rev. ed. 1995). 
Thus, Herwit's argument that there was no good faith because Bank One 
immediately allowed a withdrawal of uncollected funds is totally without merit and does 
not create a question of fact. 
2. Bank One did immediately debit its customer's account 
Contrary to Herwit's argument that "Bank One waited around two months 
maintaining the unwarranted hope that the closing on Herwit's condo would go 
through" (Herwit's brief at p. 12), the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that Bank 
One debited Aristocrat's account the very day it received notice that Herwit's check 
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would not clear. An examination of Aristocrat's account statement attached to the 
Affidavit ol Deanne Freeman, Bank One's customer service manager (R.35, see 
Addendum), shows that Herwit's check was deposited May 25, 1995; that Aristocrat 
withdrew those funds on May 26, 1995; and Bank One charged Aristocrat's account for 
a $9,000.00 "returned item" on May 31, 1995. This is consistent with the Affidavit of 
Francee Jolley, Operations Manager of First Security Bank, Herwit's bank, that 
Herwit's check was presented to First Security Bank on May 30, 1995 and returned 
that day due to insufficient funds. (R. 42.) 
Thus, Herwit's factual basis for arguing lack of good faith (i.e., failure to 
immediately debit Aristocrat's account) is non-existent. Further, there is no legal 
support for this argument as the examination of Bank One's "good faith" is at the time 
of the taking of Herwit's check, not what it did subsequently. Valley Bank of Nev.. 
supra, at 306; and Citv of Phoenix v. Great Western Bank & Trust. 712 P.2d 966, 971, 
(Ariz. App. 1985). Also, Bank One has no obligation to charge back its customer's 
account in order to pursue its claims against Herwit. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-
214(5); Nations Bank of Virginia. NA v. Cookies. Inc.r (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993) 22 U.C.C. 
Eep, 2d 838. 
3. Bank One did not allow continuing credits on uncollected 
funds after Herwit's check was returned for insufficient 
funds. 
Again, contrary to Herwit's unsupported assertions that Bank One 
"continued to credit" Aristocrat's account after learning of the NSF status of Herwit's 
check (Herwit's brief at pp. 6 and 12), Bank One did not allow such continuing 
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credits. As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Herwit's check was deposited on May 
25, 1995; was drawn against in full on May 26, 1995; was returned marked "NSF" by 
Herwit's bank on May 30, 1995; and the account was charged back on May 31, 1995. 
Thus, Herwit's allegation of lack of good faith on this basis is meritless. 
C. Bank One acted without notice of any defects. 
The third requirement for HDC status is that the holder takes the 
instrument for value in good faith and without notice of any defects in the instrument. 
Utah Code Ann., § 70A-3-302(b) (1953 as amended). This section reads, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
(1) Subject to subsection (3) and subsection 70A-3-106(4), 
"holder in due course" means the holder of an instrument if: 
(b) the holder took the instrument for value, in good faith, 
without notice that the instrument was overdue or has been 
dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect 
to payment of another instrument issued as part of the same 
series, without notice that the instrument contains an 
unauthorized signature or has been altered, without notice 
of any claim to the instrument described in section 70A-3-
306, and without notice that any party has a defense or 
claim in recoupment described in subsection 70A-3-305(l). 
Herwit argues that there is evidence in the record that should have 
precluded the circuit court from finding that Bank One acted in good faith and without 
notice at the time it took the instrument. Herwit's affidavits raised no such issue of 
fact. 
First, it is essential to keep in mind the precise language of § 70A-3-302, 
which begins with the following language, "the holder took the instrument... in good 
faith, without notice . . ." [emphasis added]. If the requirement is that a holder take an 
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instrument without notice and in good faith, the only notice which would be relevant 
would be notice that the holder had at the time of the taking. "To be effective, notice 
must be received at a time and in a manner that gives a reasonable opportunity to act 
on it." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302(6) (1993). 
It is undisputed in this case that Bank One took the instrument on May 25, 
1995, and gave value therefore on May 26, 1995. This is established by the Affidavit of 
Deanne Freeman, the instrument itself, and the account statement submitted into 
evidence through Ms. Freeman's Affidavit. (R. 28-37; see Addendum). Thus, the issue 
is whether the affidavits filed by Herwit contain sufficient facts to establish that Bank 
One had some notice of the insufficiency of the funds on which the instrument was 
drawn prior to May 26, 1998. Herwit's affidavits do not allege such a fact. Herwit 
appears to argue that Bank One is imputed with the knowledge of its depositor, or 
immediate prior transfer. Herwit alleges through his affidavit that when he delivered 
the check to the payee on May 25, 1995, he advised payee Aristocrat Travel, that the 
check would not clear (R 40). That entities' knowledge cannot be imputed to Bank 
One. See definition of "notice" received, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201 (26)(b) (1993). 
The concept of HDC was specifically developed to protect a bank in this 
situation. The official comments to § 3-305, U.C.C., makes it clear that a holder does 
not lose its HDC status based upon notice to its immediate prior transferee. 
If buyer issues an instrument to seller and buyer has a 
defense against seller, that defense can obviously be 
asserted. Buyer and seller are the only people involved. 
The holder-in-due-course doctrine has no relevance. The 
doctrine applies only in cases in which more than two 
parties are involved. Its essence is that the holder-in-due-
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course does not have to suffer the consequences of a 
defense of the obligor on the instrument that arose from an 
occurrence of a third party. [Emphasis added.] 
Commercial and Debtor/Creditor Law, selected statutes 1995 ed. Foundation Press, § 
3-305, p. 333, comment 2. 
Herwit next alleges that he believed the check was deposited on May 26, 
1995, and that sometime thereafter he spoke with officers of Bank One concerning the 
insufficiency of funds in his account to cover the check. (CR. 40 and 41 at f 4 and 5.) 
As previously pointed out and as supported by the record, Bank One had 
already given value for the check and the funds had been withdrawn from Bank One, 
Utah by Aristocrat Travel, on May 26, 1995. Any notice provided after May 26, 1995 
would not have any effect on Bank One's HDC status since it no longer had an 
opportunity to act thereon. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302(6) (1993). 
Finally, in paragraph 6 of his affidavit, Herwit alleges that "from the date 
the plaintiff received defendant's check to the present, plaintiff knew that the check 
would not clear defendant's bank." (R. 41 at H 6.) This allegation is purely 
conclusory and is unsupported by any underlying facts. It contains no specifics as to 
who, when, and where the alleged notice was provided. As such, it is insufficient to 
defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Walker v. Rocky Mt. 
Recreation Corp.. 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973); Williams v. Melbv. 679 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1985); Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983); and Treloaaan v. Treloaaan. 699 
P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). In fact, this conclusory allegation is actually controverted by the 
other allegations of Herwit's Affidavit in which he claims he only gave notice sometime 
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after May 26, 1995, (R.41) and by the second Affidavit filed by Herwit, the affidavit of 
Francee Jolley. The Affidavit of Francee Jolley, an officer of the drawee bank, First 
Security Bank, establishes that the check was returned to Bank One on May 30, 1995 
(R.42). This is five days after the instrument was taken and four days after value was 
given. Again, there are no facts in the record which would raise a dispute as to 
whether Bank One had any notice at the time it took the instrument and gave value 
therefore. 
As a result, it cannot be said that the lower court committed an error of 
law if it concluded that Bank One took the instrument in good faith, without notice, and 
therefore is entitled to HDC status. 
In his brief (p. 10) Herwit argues that the Affidavit of Francee Jolley 
contains the following language: 
I never had a conversation with anyone that First Security 
Bank would honor the foregoing check. In fact, the check 
was not honored nor has it ever been honored. As 
operations manager, I would be aware as to whether 
anyone in our office would have either honored the check 
or stated to any party that the check was honored. I have 
discussed the matter with the branch manager. It is against 
bank policy to honor a check received the way Mr. 
Herwit's was received. Neither the branch manager or me 
ever honored the foregoing check nor did we state to 
anyone that the check would be honored in fact the check 
was dishonored on May 30, 1995 and returned that day to 
Bank One. 
Even if this material appeared in the affidavit of Francee Jolley it would be 
irrelevant. It would only establish notice which Bank One did not have. It does not 
establish that Bank One had any notice. However, and more importantly, this material 
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cited by Herwit does not appear in the affidavit of Francee Jolley. If an affidavit 
containing this material exists, it was never filed with the Third Circuit Court or 
provided to Bank One's counsel. In alleging that this material appears in the affidavit 
of Francee Jolley, Herwit is taking serious liberties with the record herein. 
Herwit relies on the case of Seinfeld v. Commercial Bank and Trust Co.. 
405 So.2d 1029 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1981). This case can be distinguished from the case 
before this Court. Herwit argues in his brief (p. 12) that the Seinfeld case involves 
checks on which a depository bank paid, and "then continued to credit the payee's 
account after the checks were returned for insufficient funds." This clearly 
distinguishes it from the case before this Court. 
All evidence in the record establishes that the check in question was 
returned for insufficient funds on May 30, 1995 and received by Bank One on May 31, 
1995. Bank One did not continue to credit the payee's account thereafter for the 
$9,000.00. All funds had been withdrawn from that account on May 26, 1995.4 This is 
established by the account statements which were submitted to the lower court 
through the affidavit of Deanne Freeman. (R. 35, see Addendum.) Bank One charged 
back the payee's account upon receipt of the returned item, however, this only 
resulted in an overdraft in excess of $9,000.00. Herwit's affidavits do not raise a 
genuine issue as to any material fact pertaining to notice which Bank One may have 
4
 The law clearly provides for application of a first in-first out rule. Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-4-210(2) (1993). 
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had at the time it took and gave value for the instrument in question and therefore, the 
lower court committed no reversible error. 
Further, it should be noted that Seinfeld is a single contrary case from a 
court in south Florida which is treated as an aberation by respected treatises which 
have refered to the Florida court as having H.. .acted with possibly unreasonable 
strictness against a bank . . .H and which go on to describe the holding in the Seinfeld 
case as one which ".. .appears contrary to other cases ...." Henry J. Bailey and 
Richard B. Hagedorn, Brady on Bank Checks, 8-23; and 8-46 (7th ed. 1992). The 
holding in Seinfeld is certainly contrary to Utah law which, as cited earlier makes it 
perfectly clear that good faith is to be measured at the time of the "taking11 of an 
instrument. 
In summary, Bank One has clearly demonstrated a prima facie case for 
HDC status. There was no evidence submitted by Herwit demonstrating material 
issues of fact on whether Bank One, (1) failed to give value, (2) lacked good faith, or 
(3) had prior notice of defenses. To the contrary, all the evidence indicates that Bank 
One is an HDC and entitled to enforce the check against Herwit on his drawer's 
liability. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment.9 
8
 This case is nearly identical to First America Bank-Northeast Illinois. NA v. 
Bocian. 614 N.E. 2d 890 (HI. App. 2d dist. 1993). The Illinois court reviewed the 
Uniform Commercial Code - negotiable Instruments and substantial case law and held 
that summary judgment was appropriate in allowing the bank as a HDC to enforce the 
check against the drawer. 
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POINT IV 
THE CIRCUIT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
HERWTPS AFFIDAVITS FAILED TO RAISE ANY 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CHECK BY BANK ONE AS A 
HOLDER. 
Bank One's right to enforce check number 2526 as a holder, subject to 
defenses properly raised by Herwit, is an issue which need only be raised if Bank One 
is not an HDC. In the event Bank One is a mere holder of the instrument, Bank One 
takes the instrument subject to any contract defenses Herwit may have to the 
instrument, lltah Code Ann. § 70A-3-305 (1953 as amended).6 
8
 Herwit, at page 14 of his brief, cites to the Court the language of the above cited 
section as it appeared by prior enactment which was repealed and re-codified in 1993. 
The language of the current applicable section is as follows: 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2) the right to 
enforce the obligation of a party to pay an instrument 
is subject to the following: (b) a defense of the 
obligor stated in another section of this chapter or a 
defense of the obligor that would be available if the 
person entitled to enforce the instrument were 
enforcing a right to payment under a simple contract; 
and (c)(i) a claim in recoupment of the obligor 
against the original payee of the instrument if the 
claim arose from the transaction that gave rise to the 
transaction; (ii) but the claim of the obligor may be 
asserted against a transferee of the instrument only to 
reduce the amount owing on the instrument at the 
time the action is brought. 
(2) The right of a holder in due course to enforce 
the obligation of a party to pay the instrument is 
subject to defenses of the obligor stated in 
subsection (l)(a), but is not subject to defenses of 
the obligor stated in subsection (l)(b) or claims in 
recoupment stated in subsection (l)(c) against a 
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Herwit alleges that he has two affirmative defenses to enforcement of 
check number 2526. Those are conditional delivery/delivery for a special purpose and 
failure of consideration. Neither of these defenses are available to Herwit as they are 
affirmative defenses which, pursuant to Rule 12, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are 
waived if not raised by answer. 
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads in relevant part as 
follows: 
A party waives all defenses and objections which he does 
not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if 
he has made no motion, in his answer or reply . . .. 
Herwit has filed no motions in this action raising any defenses. Herwit 
raised no affirmative defenses by way of answer. The defenses on which Herwit relies 
in this appeal are affirmative defenses which were waived due to Herwit's failure to 
properly raise them below. 
In Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that affirmative defenses must be revised in the answer. In Gill, a party 
attempted to raise failure to mitigate damages as an argument on appeal. The Utah 
Supreme Court rejected this argument stating: 
"Mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense." [Citation 
omitted.] Affirmative defenses must be set forth in 
responsive pleadings, Utah R Civ. P. 8(c), and are usually 
waived if not so pleaded. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). This court 
has explained the reason for this result: since an affirmative 
defense raises matters outside of the scope of plaintiff's 
prima facie case, any matter which does not tend to 
person other than the holder. 
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controvert the opposing party's prima facie case should be 
pleaded and is not put in issue by denial pursuant to Rule 
8(b) [Utah R Civ. P.]. 
Id at 1353-54. 
It is clear under Utah law that Bank One made out its prima facie case. A 
prima facie case for enforcement of a negotiable instrument is defined at § 70A-3-308, 
which reads in relevant part as follows: 
(1) In an action with respect to an instrument, the 
authenticity of, and authority to make each signature on the 
instrument is admitted unless specifically denied in the 
pleadings . . . (2) if the validity of signatures is admitted or 
proved and there is compliance with subsection (1) a 
plaintiff producing the instrument is entitled to payment if 
the plaintiff proves entitlement to enforcement under section 
70A-3-301, unless the defendant proves a defense or claim 
in recoupment [Emphasis added.] 
The above-cited section was interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court to 
define a plaintiff's prima facie case on a negotiable instrument. "It is not disputed that 
the introduction of the check, admittedly executed and issued by the defendant, made 
a prima facie case of its genuineness . . . consequently, the burden of establishing his 
defense to the contrary shifted to the defendant." lager & Branch. Inc. v. Paooas. 433 
P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1967). 
As a result, Herwit's defense of conditional delivery/delivery for a 
specific purpose, is a matter outside of Bank One's prima facie case and should have 
been raised as an affirmative defense. Not having been raised by way of an answer it 
is waived and cannot be raised by an affidavit filed in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment. Therefore, this defense was properly rejected by the trial court. 
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The result is the same for Herwit's belated allegation of lack of 
consideration. In Vallev Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken. 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court was faced with a case in which a defendant attempted to raise the 
affirmative defense of lack of consideration by affidavit filed in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment. This argument was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court which 
stated: 
Appellant's sole contention is that the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment because her husband's 
affidavit had raised the defense of failure of consideration. 
The difficulty with her argument is that she was obligated to 
raise that defense in her answer to the complaint. She 
made only a general denial in her answer and did not raise 
any affirmative defenses. Failure of consideration is an 
affirmative defense and must be treated as such.. . . She 
could not raise it by means of an affidavit in opposition to 
summary judgment. It is not the office of an affidavit in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment to provide a 
means of introducing defenses which have not been raised 
by answer or by proper motion. [Emphasis added.] 
Id at 493-94. 
Further, Herwit's argument that there is a lack of consideration is 
predicated on a parenthetical insertion in his brief (see p. 14) in which he alleges that 
he tendered the check to Aristocrat Travel in order to purchase an equity position in 
that corporation and that the corporation has subsequently gone bankrupt and that he 
therefore never received anything of value for his money. There is absolutely nothing 
in the record to support this alleged basis for failure of consideration. Thus, this 
defense was not raised in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, and cannot 
be raised on appeal for the first time. Further, since Aristocrat was indeed paid on the 
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instrument, Herwit did, in fact, pay for the equity position and arguably owns an equity 
position in Aristocrat. Apparently Herwit's true argument is that the equity position he 
bought no longer has any value, but the wisdom of Herwit's purchase is not a matter 
that can be raised against Bank One. 
Like the defendant in Valley Bank & Trust Co.. Herwit filed an answer 
which constituted only a general denial and raised no affirmative defenses. 
Consequently, these affirmative defenses cannot be raised through an affidavit filed in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment and are insufficient to create an issue of 
material fact. Therefore, even if Bank One is a holder rather than an HDC, Bank One 
remains able to enforce the Herwit's check and the trial court's decision is 
supportable and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that Herwit is the drawer of a check made payable to 
Aristocrat Travel. It is undisputed that Aristocrat Travel then negotiated the check to 
Bank One and immediately obtained value therefore. It is undisputed that Bank One's 
first notice that the instrument was drawn on insufficient funds came four to five days 
later. Consequently, the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in Bank 
One's favor is supportable as Bank One is entitled to the status of holder in due 
course, thereby taking free of any of Herwit's alleged defenses. 
Even if Bank One is a mere holder, Bank One is still entitled to enforce 
the instrument subject to any properly raised defenses. No defenses were raised by 
answer or subsequent motion. Again, the trial court did not err when it concluded, as 
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answer or subsequent motion. Again, the trial court did not err when it concluded, as 
a matter of law, that Bank One is entitled to summary judgment against Paul Herwit. 
Finally, it should be remembered that the Herwit did not raise any 
defenses by way of answer or subsequent motion. Herwit did not file any 
memorandum in the lower court. Therefore, Herwit failed to preserve any of the issues 
which he now attempts to argue to this Court. The present appeal is therefore 
frivolous and interposed merely for delay, entitling Bank One to an award of its 
attorney's fees on appeal under Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which 
reads in relevant part as follows: 
". . .[I]f the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages, which may include single or 
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable 
attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or the party's 
attorney. 
Wherefore, Bank One requests that this Court affirm the trial court's ruling and 
award Bank One its attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /& day of February, 1996. 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C, 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 53 9-8632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
ooOoo 
BANK ONE, UTAH, National 
Association, fka VALLEY BANK 





AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE FREEMAN 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950009179 CV 
Judge Hutchings 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss . 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
I, Deanne Freeman, being first duly sworn depose and say as 
follows: 
1, I am the Customer Service Manager of the Bountiful office 
of Bank One, Utah. 
2. By virtue of my responsibilities in regard thereto I have 
access to the records of Bank One, Utah as they pertain to the 
negotiable instrument which is the subject matter of the present 
action and transactions affecting the account of the payee thereon 
Civil No. 950009179 
Judge Hutchings 
Aristocrat Travel and Cruises of Park City, Inc. 
3. Records produced herewith are maintained in the ordinary 
course of business of Bank One, Utah. 
4. On May 25, 1995 check number 2526 drawn on the account of 
Paul Herwit^ at First Security Bank was deposited to the account of 
Aristocrat Travel and Cruises of Park City, Inc., account number 
13477545, at Bank One, Utah. A copy of check number 2526 is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
5. On May 3 0 I contacted First Security Bank to inquire as 
to whether check number 2526 had cleared First Security Bank. I 
was advised on May 30, 1995 that the check had been honored, and I 
credited the payee's account accordingly. 
6. After receiving credit for check number 2526 the payee 
withdrew from its account the funds so credited. Copies of 
relevant monthly statements are attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
7. On or about May 31, 1995 First Security Bank refused to 
accept check number 2526 and refused to remit payment thereon. The 
instrument was returned due to insufficient funds and bearing the 
notation "RTM" (refer to maker). 
2 
Civil No. 950009179 
Judge Hutchings 
8. Paul Herwit is not a client of Bank One, Utah. Prior to 
honoring his check Bank One, Utah received no communication or 
notice from Paul Herwit regarding check number 2526. 
9. Bank One, Utah is currently in possession of check number 
2526. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this ^M^Siay of August, 1995. 
Deanne Freema 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this cJ2<-f day of 
Sigus-r 1995. 
My Commission Expires 
^-•r-96 
NOT. 
Residing in j&cc^iSpsZ^ ^ ^ ^ 
3 
Civil No. 950009179 
Judge Hutchings 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the £ I day of August, 1995, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
H. Delbert Welker 
Attorney for Defendant 
3540 South 4000 West, #430 
West Valley City, UT 84120 







MAY 3 0 1995 
£5/26/95 REC0VED 1240-0001 








PAUL HERWIT 1 -93 2526 
ra^fe.'i 
/rjc^^^^r 
A ^ ^/f> YS?,Z**-m£k 
$ y^c-V-
First First Security Bank of Utah 
Security p.o. BOX i MO 
Bank © Par*.c">'i;,a/i 8 4 0 6 ° 
EM0 —iZTw^Tm oa-V'— 
& j ^ & ¥ & & $ & 




VALLEY BUSINESS CHECKING 
BOUNTIFUL OFFICE 
510 SOUTH 200 WEST 





ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL ft CRUISES OF PARK 
CITY INC 
3330 S 700 E $ 112 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106-1544 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY AS OF 05-31-95 





BEGINNING BALANCE AS OF 04-28-95 
PLUS 4 DEPOSITS/CREDITS 
LESS 11 CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS 
LESS SERVICE CHARGE 










EARNINGS CREDIT SUMMARY -
AVERAGE COLLECTED BALANCE 
X EARNINGS CREDIT FACTOR 
























SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL 
EARNINGS ALLOWANCE 








AMOUNT l/ATE DESCRIPTION 
4.071.66 05-25 DEPOSIT ^ 


















>5-10 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE 







BANK ONE UTAH NA 
CHECK PRINTING 













05-26 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE 















THANK YOU POP BANKING WITH BANK ONE UTAH NA 
13 4 7 - 7 5 4 5 
VALLEY BUSINESS CHECKING 
BOUNTUUL Off ICE 
510 SOUTH 200 WEST 






ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL t CRUISES OF PARK 
CITY INC 
3330 S 700 E # 112 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106-1544 
285 
QUESTIONS? CALL: 
4 8 1 - 5 6 0 0 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY AS OF 0 6 - 3 0 - 9 5 
BALANCE SUMMARY 
BEGINNING BALANCE AS OF 0 5 - 3 1 - 9 5 
PLUS 3 DEPOSITS/CREDITS 
LESS 7 CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS 
LESS SERVICE CHARGE 








EARNINGS CREDIT SUMMARY 
AVERAGE COLLECTED BALANCE 
X EARNINGS CREDIT FACTOR 








- - SERVICE CHARGE SUMMARY -










SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL 
EARNINGS ALLOWANCE 






06-02 MISCELLANEOUS CREDIT 








05-31 PED 052195 
06-07 f>BO 052895 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
05-31 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE 
06-07 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE 













0 6 - 2 1 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE 
0 6 - 2 8 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE 
AMOUNT 
1 1 , 1 2 0 . 8 5 
AMOUNT 
3 , 1 8 9 . 4 4 
1 1 , 1 2 0 . 8 5 
AMCUNT 
1 7 . 0 0 
1 7 . 0 0 
THANK YOU PQR BANKING W« r H BANK ONE UTAH NA 
MEM6EP FDtC 
0 17 1 3 4 7 - 7 5 4 5 
BANK=ON£. 
VALLEY BUSINESS CHECKING 
BOUNTIFUL OFFICE 
510 SOUTH 200 WEST 





ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL % CRUISES OF PARK 
CITY INC 
3330 S 700 E 0 112 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106-1544 
285 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY AS OF 07-31-95 




BEGINNING BALANCE AS OF 06-30-95 
PLUS 4 DEPOSITS/CREDITS 
LESS 7 CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS 
LESS SERVICE CHARGE 











07-05 PED 062595 
07-12 PED 070295 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
07-05 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE 
07-11 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE 
07-12 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE 
0 ENCLOSURES 
DEPOSITS/CREDITS 
AMOUNT DATE DESCRIPTION 
3,854.93 y 07-26 MISCELLANEOUS CREDIT 
5,219.62v 07-31 OVERDRAFT CHARGE-OFF 
CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS 
DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION 
ARC SETTLEMENT 0705 46528565 






07-19 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE 










17 134 7-7 54 5 
